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CASE COMMENTS
Torts--Defective Design
Decedent, Robert Pike, was killed when struck by a paydozer
manufactured by the Frank G. Hough Company, and a wrongful
death action was brought against the defendant manufacturer.
Plaintiffs contended that the manufacturer should have been aware
that the machine's structural design made it impossible for an oper-
ator to see a six-foot man standing in a twenty by forty-eight feet
rectangular area in the rear of the machine, and that the manufac-
turer could easily have reduced the blind spot to a cone-shaped area
with a maximum length of twelve feet with the installation of rear
view mirrors. Plaintiffs sought to establish the liability of the de-
fendant on either a negligence or a strict liability theory, based on
the design of the paydozer. The trial court nonsuited the plaintiffs,
holding as a matter of law that the machine was neither defectively
nor negligently designed, and therefore the doctrine of strict liability
was inapplicable. On appeal, held, judgment reversed. A manufactur-
er must use reasonable care to design his product to make it safe
for the use for which it is intended, and additionally, strict liability
may be imposed upon a manufacturer for injuries which arise from
defective design as well as defects in manufacture. Pike v. Frank G.
Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
The significance of Pike is two-fold. First, the court applied
traditional negligence concepts to a manufacturer who negligently
designed a product without the court's considering defective or neg-
ligent manufacture. Second, the court imposed strict liability on a
manufacturer who defectively designed a product and extended
the strict liability concept to encompass mere bystanders.
I. THE NEGLIGENCE ISSUE
The court relied heavily on section 398 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to impose negligence liability on manufacturers
for defective design. The standard previously applied to a manufac-
turer had been one of reasonable care to design his product so as
to make it safe for the use intended, although this design need not
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965) provides:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which
makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is
subject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the chattel
or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm caused by
his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan
or design.
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be accident-proof.2 The court in Pike stated that the likelihood of
harm from a machine of a particular design must be weighed against
the burden incurred when necessary precautions are taken to avoid
the harm.'
The problems involved in establishing negligence for defective
design are similar to those encountered in establishing negligence in
defective manufacture. While negligent manufacture or construc-
tion is carlessness in the actual building of a product, negligent or de-
fective design involves improper planning of a product.' A number of
cases have held that as evidence of proper design, one may estab-
lish that a very large number of the products were used without
an injury of the kind for which recovery was sought.'
In Menchaca v. Helms Bakeries, Inc.,' a case similar to Pike,
the court held that a well-constructed product may have been neg-
ligently equipped - precisely what the plaintiff contended in Pike.
In neither Pike nor Menchaca was there any contention that the
machines had been defectively manufactured. The negligence in these
cases was predicated on defective design of the products, and the
injuries were incurred by bystanders. In permitting recovery under
these circumstances the California court extended the manufacturer's
duty of care to third persons or bystanders, thereby effectively elim-
inating any issue of privity and extending the manufacturer's scope
of liability to include those who would be expected to come in contact
with or be endangered by the qualities of design which were found
defective.
2 Davlin v. Henry Ford & Son, 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927); Dean v.
General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. La. 1969); Varas v. Barco
Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 258, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737, 744 (1962); Campo
v. Schofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
3 2 Cal. 3rd at -, 467 P.2d at 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 632. 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, THE LAw oF TORTS §28.4 at 1542 (1956).
4 Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., U. S. Av. 71 (Mich Cir. Ct. 1940).
5 Simmons v. Gibbs Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ohio 1959), alf'd,
275 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1960). See also Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d
265 (5th Cir. 1935) (conformity of design to standard manufacturing prac-
tice); Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 565 (1929) (non-occurrence of accidents from the use of numerous
other products of same type produced by defendant); Reusch v. Ford Motor
Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938) (prolonged use of product prior to
occurrence of injury). But see, Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co.,
216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (W. Va. law applied); Beadles v. Servel Inc.,
344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951).
6 68 Cal. 2d 535, 439 P.2d 903, 67 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1968). See also
Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal Rptr. 420 (1970).
[Vol. 73200
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The defendant in Pike argued that the danger of being struck by
the paydozer was a patent peril, and therefore there was no duty to
install safety devices." While the court recognized that the obvious-
ness of peril was relevant to the manufacturer's defenses, especially
in establishing contributory negligence, the court explained that the
patency of the peril did not concern the duty issue.8 The manufac-
turer's duty is to so design a product so that it is safe for the use in-
tended and for the people who might reasonably be expected to come
into contact with it. The court indicated that the manufacturer's duty
of care extends to all persons within the range of the potential
danger, including bystanders,9 and not just the purchaser or prospec-
tive user of a product.
The modem rule, supported by recent decisions, seems to be
that the creation of any unreasonable danger is enough to establish
negligence, and whether a defect is latent or patent is material only
in the jury's determination of whether the user takes an unreason-
able risk when he uses the product.'"
II. THE STRICT LmiArry IssuE
The present trend appears to follow the Restatement (Second)
of Torts §402A" which establishes a basis of strict liability for de-
7 2 Cal. 3d at _, 467 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
' Id. See also Montesano v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 213 F. Supp. 141
(W.D. Pa. 1962) (employer's knowledge of defective design did not insulate
manufacturer from liability); But see Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co.,
255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969) (machine designer who built and
installed a machine was not liable to an injured operator for failing to equip
the machine with protective guards, shields, and automatic shutoff switch
where danger in operating the machine was readily apparent to the operator).
9See also Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d
168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (a member of the buyer's family); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962) (retail buyer); Casetta v. United States Rubber Co., 260 Cal.App. 2d 792, 67 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1968) (buyer's employee); Matthews v.
Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (buyer's customer).
"0 Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J 816, 836 (1962); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW
OF ToRTs § 28.5 at 1542 (1956); Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 342
F.2d 519 (3rd Cir. 1965); Calkins v. Sandven, 256 Iowa 682, 129 N.W.2d1 (1964); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
"RsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides in part:(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
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fective design. The general rule has been to allow recovery for de-
fective manufacture either under a negligence or strict liability
theory.' 2 The Pike court found no rational distinction between de-
fective design and manufacture since the product may be as dan-
gerous if defectively designed as it would be if defectively manufac-
tured. 3 For authority the court cited Greeman v. Yuba Power Pro-
ducts, Inc.,1 4 which held that strict liability applied when the plain-
tiff was injured due to both a defective design and defective manu-
facture, and Garcia v. Halsett,'5 which held the owner of a launder-
ette strictly liable for defective design (as a manufacturer would be)
in the failure to install available safety devices on his washing ma-
chines.
In further support of the application of strict liability, the court
relied on the Illinois case of Suvada v. White Motor Co.,'6 which
imposed strict liability on the manufacturer of a brake unit found
to be defectively manufactured. One year later the Illinois court,
in Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 7 expanded the strict liability con-
cept to include injuries which resulted from defects in design as well
as defects in manufacture.
The trend toward strict liability in both defective manufacture
and defective design must be limited to correspond to the design and
manufacturing skill which exists in a given industry.'" The question
of a manufacturer's duty in the design of a product still remains a
question of law for the courts to decide,' 9 but with defective design
and defective manufacture separated it should be easier to establish
defective design.
2 Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (automo-
bile); McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960)(insect spray); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (power saw design); Peterson v. Lamb
Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960) (grinding
wheel); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 823 (1961) (bottle).
13 2 Cal. 3d at _, 467 P.2d at 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
14 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 967 (1962).
113 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970) (absence of a $2
micro-switch resulted in strict liability for the machine's owner).
16 32 Ill 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
17 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).1 1Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968).
19 Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495
(8th Cir. 1968), rev'g 274 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1967); Schemel v. General
Motors Corp., 261 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 384 F.2d 802 (7th
Cir. 1967); Kahn v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex.
1963.)
[Vol. 73
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Product liability, especially concerning defective design, is still
in the developing stage, yet recent decisions in the field of automoble
design indicate an effort to fix liability on the manufacturer. Applica-
tion of the intended use doctrine"0 to defective design may very well
be the basis for future suits. One recent case, Evans v. General Mo-
tors Corp., held that a manufacturer owes a duty to design a ve-
hicle that will be safe for the use intended, but the court explained
that collisions were not a part of the use intended.22 However, Larien
v. General Motors Corp." appears to have challenged the traditional
intended use doctrine as applied to automobiles by holding that the
function of an automobile in our society is not merely to provide a
means of transportation,2" but to provide safe travel with other au-
tomobiles at speeds that carry the "possibility, probability, and poten-
tial of injury-producing impacts."'"
Ill. IMPLICATIONS
While the decision in Pike lends strength to the advocates of in-
creased manufacturer liability, the effect on the West Virginia courts
is at best unpredictable. As recently as 1962 the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals upheld express warranties limiting liability."6
In Williams v. Chrysler Corp.' the court stated, "[t]he rule seems to
be well settled in this jurisdiction that a party to a valid contract may
in advance limit its liability so long as one of the parties thereto is
not a common carrier or where the negligent act which in futuro ex-
empted did not amount to willful, wanton, or gross misconduct."' 8
The Williams case, however, was decided on a tort theory rather than
on a warranty theory of liability.
Federal cases applying West Virginia law seem to have ex-
panded the manufacturer's liability considerably; it is impossible to
20 When a manufacturer designs and manufactures a piece of equipment,
negligence may be predicated upon a failure to design the product to be safe
for the use intended. Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co.,
248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956).
21 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
22 Id. at 825.
3274 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1967), rev'd, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.
1968).24 See also Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165
S.E.2d 734 (1969); Mickle v. Blackman, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
25 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
26 Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622
(1962). The court in Nettles v. Imperial Distributors, Inc., 152 W. Va. 9,
159 S.E.2d 206 (1968) cited Payne with approval, but also pointed out that
the Uniform Commercial Code might affect existing case law.
27 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E. 2d 225 (1964).
21d. at 665, 137 S.E.2d at 231.
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estimate whether the state court would interpret West Virginia law in
a like manner. In Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co.,29 which
is probably the closest West Virginia has come to a reported defec-
tive design case, the federal court, applying West Virginia law, found
negligence in the design of the petcock of the brakes of a bus. The
manufacturer, General Motors Corp., was found negligent in the de-
sign of the petcock and liability was established without resorting to
a discussion of privity or warranty. In General Motors Corp. v. John-
son,30 a 1943 federal case applying West Virginia law, the issue
of privity was disposed of by the court's statement that "the manu-
facturer of a truck . . .owes a duty to the public, irrespective of
contract. ...""
In Shanklin v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,3" a case similar to
Wright v. Massey-Harris Inc.3 (an Illinois case cited in Pike which
found the defendant strictly liable in the design of a cor-picker),
the court, using an Erie educated guess, stated:
We do not find that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia has as yet made a clear-cut definitive ruling on
the question of privity requirement in the area of a non-
inherently or non-imminently dangerous instrumentality.
We find, however, that if this case, where negligence is
the gravemen of the complaint, were presented to that
Court upon the record now before us, it would adopt the
modem view by holding that such a showing is not a re-
quirement for maintenance of the action. 4
This statement by a federal court, while not binding, may accurately
reflect the law in West Virginia, since the court in Williams passed
over the privity issue, leaving it open for further consideration."
As a practical matter a West Virginia practitioner might find it de-
sirable when possible to bring suit in a federal court rather than a
29216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).
30 137 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1943).
a, Id. at 322.
32254 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
33 68 l. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).34 Shanklin v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 254 F. Supp. 223, 231 (S.D.
W. Va. 1966). Both the Shanklin and Wright cases concerned injury sus-
tained by a farm worker on a corn picking machine due to the lack of guards
on safety features. In Wright the Illinois court considered the corn picker
an unreasonably dangerous product and imposed strict liability. In the Shank-
lin case the West Virginia court gave the plaintiff standing, but the plaintiff
lost because of a finding of contributory negligence.35 Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
[Vol. 73
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state court since the privity issue seems more settled by the federal
decision.
It appears that West Virginia would probably accept the doc-
trine of strict liability laid down by Pike, although a suit founded on
negligence in product design might be successful on the basis of
Carpini"6 or Shanklin."' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has yet to make a definitive ruling on the privity issue in light
of Williams or the Uniform Commercial Code, and, until such a
decision is made, the status of West Virginia law with regard
to defective design or manufacture will remain unsettled.
Carl N. Frankovitch
36 Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3rd Cir. 1954).
37 254 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
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